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INTRODUCTION 
ANITA L. ALLEN -CASTELLITTO* 
Where do non-human animals fit into the moral universe? They are not 
proper moral agents, rational persons held morally responsible for their 
conduct. But they are proper moral patients. They are sentient creatures 
capable of suffering, whose well-being is increasingly in human hands, and 
whose treatment by humans reflects deeply on human character and ethical 
values. 
Given animals' ethical significance, what role should the law have in 
fostering animal welfare-or for that matter, animal rights or animal 
liberation? To what extent should our relationships with animals as sources 
of food, drugs, clothing, furniture, entertainment, companionship, work and 
research subjects be regulated by state and federal law? 
The University of Pennsylvania is an apt institution to sponsor a journal 
devoted to these important questions of policy and morals, for it has had to 
confront concerns about the well-being of animals the hard way. Twenty 
years ago, Penn was the scene of controversial experiments on primates. 
Investigating the potentially tragic outcomes for humans affected by head 
injuries, Penn researchers deliberately subjected unanesthetized primates to 
skull trauma. 
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PET A) labeled the Penn 
primate experiments inhumane. PET A activists broke into a campus lab and 
stole a videotape of the experiments. The graphic videotape was televised 
and, as a result, the University's Head Injury Center lost favor with the 
public and federal funding. Penn quickly stopped testing on primates and 
set up an institutional review board to monitor all subsequent animal 
research. According to Dr. Tracey K. Mcintosh, today the University's 
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Head Injury Center adheres to "the highest standards of animal welfare. "1 
The University of Pennsylvania Law School is proud to welcome the 
inaugural volume of the Journal of Animal Law and Ethics. A diverse 
group of distinguished and emerging scholars have contributed to this 
exciting first volume. 
In his Article, noted animal rights theorist and lawyer Professor Gary 
Francione of Rutgers University School of Law-Newark takes up the core 
question of membership in the moral community. He argues that sentience 
alone, rather than human-like cognitive capacities, is sufficient for full 
membership in the moral community. The animal welfare movement, he 
argues, has failed to recognize this. 
But what is "animal welfare," really? The practical meaning of "animal 
welfare" is explored in an essay by Dr. Robert Gamer, a political 
philosopher from the University of Leicester in Great Britain. He argues 
that to speak of "animal welfare" is to strike a compromise between 
according animals the full moral standing of human beings and according 
them no moral standing at all. While the middle way Dr. Gamer defends 
may not pass ideal philosophical muster, he believes it is a useful political 
stance for securing policies that protect animals from the most wanton, 
egregious harms in a world of die-hard speciesists. 
Taking off from the premises that higher animals are indeed part of the 
moral community and that animal welfare policies are necessary, Professor 
Ani Satz of Emory Law School boldly argues for a conception of animal 
welfare that is close to what Mr. Garner might consider an impractically 
radical call for animal rights. Professor Satz urges a "nondiscrimination 
paradigm for animal welfare similar to the paradigms applied to other 
oppressed groups, including the disabled." When deciding how to treat 
animals, like monkeys, sheep, cows or pigs, she contends that policy-makers 
should think about whether they have good reasons to treat animals 
differently from humans with similar characteristics. 
Further pursuing the meaning of animal welfare, University of Arizona 
Law Professor Darian M. Ibrahim attacks anticruelty statutes as inadequate 
and ineffective protectors of animals. The problem, he argues, is that 
anticruelty statutes call for humane treatment, but do not prevent people 
from exploiting animals. We are still allowed to commercially farm animals 
for food industries, hunt for sport, and use animals in research. All of this is 
exploitation, Ibrahim believes, that by its very nature requires tremendous 
1 Jon Caroulis, Brain Injury: A Silent Epidemic, http://www.upenn.edu/pennew 
s/researchatpenn/article.php?452&hlt (last visited May 2, 2006). 
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suffering and makes humane treatment impossible. Until the law moves 
beyond the "humane exploitation" paradigm, animals will be mistreated. 
And animals may be mistreated, even when they are prized exhibits at 
zoos and zoological parks around the world. In his Article, Aaron Komfield 
tells the story of the unhappy fate of elephants at the San Francisco Zoo, 
who died because their artificial habitat was woefully inadequate to their 
needs. Kornfield concludes that the day of the zoo as a place to see "exotic 
animals" has come and gone: we should know better. Rather than attempt 
to maintain animals out of their natural habit in foreign lands in accordance 
with harmfully utilitarian zoo accreditation standards, zoos would do better, 
he argues, to offer the public a close look at regionally indigenous species 
for which they could adequately care. 
Collette L. Adkins Giese shows that nonhuman primates, like the 
elephants Kornfield describes, are often poorly cared for by their caretakers 
and are ill-served by existing animal welfare laws governing research. Even 
provisions of the Animal Welfare Act enacted in the wake of PET A's 
disclosures of Penn's head-injury research, "Improved Standards for 
Laboratory Animals Act of 1985," fall short, she argues. Mounting 
evidence of the true psychological needs of highly intelligent chimpanzees 
and other nonhuman primates renders current standards for caring for 
captive apes, chimps and monkeys obsolete. 
If animal welfare doesn't grab you, what about human welfare? How 
does it feel to spend your workday killing chickens or harvesting duck 
livers? How does it feel to have someone maliciously kill your pet? 
UCLA Law Professor Taimie Bryant assesses the impact on food 
industry workers of witnessing and participating in violence against animals 
destined for the dinner table. Convinced that animal slaughter threatens the 
psychological health and moral well-being of humans exposed to it, 
Professor Bryant forcefully argues for what she calls "collaborative 
advocacy" between animal welfare and human welfare advocates. 
Professor William A. Reppy, Jr. of Duke Law School addresses a legal 
issue that goes to the heart of the human-animal companion relationship: 
whether a person who intentionally kills another's pet should be liable for 
both the market value of the pet and for punitive damages for the emotional 
pain and suffering caused to the pet's owner. Reppy looks at recent case 
law to address the competing tendencies to treat animals like mere property 
or as companions whose loss can lead to grief and pain the law ought to 
recogmze. 
Together, the Articles and Comment in this volume provide readers a 
vivid, stimulating introduction to the ethics and law of animals. I look 
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forward to what future issues will bring. All of the contributors to this 
volume share a strong belief that animals merit special protection. There are 
no articles by avid hunters, researchers dependent upon animal subjects, or 
chicken producers. The friendly consensus of volume one must inevitably 
yield to debates and disagreements among contributors of radically different 
viewpoints in future volumes. The world is indeed divided between people 
who see no harm in using animals to serve human ends and those who 
would protect them as fellow travelers. This journal is committed to a 
scholarly airing of all sides. 
